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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KELLY RAY DEBOARD, : Case No. 980387-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
DEBOARD'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT SINCE THE ISSUE AFFECTS THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST, IS LIKELY TO RECUR, AND IS CAPABLE OF 
EVADING REVIEW GIVEN THE BRIEF TIME THAT DEBOARD AND 
SIMILARLY SITUATED INDIVIDUALS MAY BE AFFECTED. 
The State concedes that sentencing is a critical stage of a 
criminal proceeding wherein a defendant is entitled to counsel and 
that Deboard was "unrepresented at the May 13, 1998 hearing." See 
State's Brief ("S.B.") at 5; see United States Const, amend. VI 
(guaranteeing the right to counsel); Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 
(Supp. 1998) (same) ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1995) 
(providing that defendant is entitled to counsel in criminal 
prosecutions). 
Nonetheless, the State asserts that Deboard's claim on appeal 
is moot. S.B.5-9. The State contends that the judicial relief 
requested by Deboard would not affect his rights and, furthermore, 
there are no other collateral legal consequences that merit review 
of his case. S.B.5-6. The State bases its argument on the fact 
that Deboard had a second sentencing hearing on June 19, 1998 at 
which time the judge suspended 300 days of the original 365 day 
sentence. S.B.6. 
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Contrary to the State's assertion, Deboard's issue on appeal 
is not moot because it fits within an exception to the mootness 
doctrine. In State v. Fife, 911 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1996), 
this Court discussed the mootness doctrine and outlined one of the 
exceptions thereto. The Court noted that as a "general rule . . . 
appellate courts 'refrain from adjudicating issues when the 
underlying case is moot.'" Id. (quoting Burkett v. Schwendiman, 
773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)). 
The exception to the general rule occurs when three 
elements have been met: (1) the case presents an issue 
that affects the public interest; (2) the issue is likely 
to recur; and (3) because of the brief time that any one 
litigant is affected, the issue is capable of evading 
review. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
The present case falls within the Fife exception to the 
mootness doctrine. First, as a matter of public interest, a 
sentencing court should not be allowed to sentence defendants 
outside the presence of their attorneys. The Utah and federal 
constitutions both enshrine a defendant's right to counsel at 
sentencing because of the particular impact and complexities that 
sentencing presents to defendants standing alone before a court. 
See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; see also 
Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 5-9 (discussing the pitfalls faced by 
defendants at sentencing necessitating the right to counsel). In 
honoring a defendant's right to counsel at sentencing, courts both 
further the ends of justice and judicial economy to the extent that 
preventable rehearing of issues is avoided. Consequently, a 
sentencing court like the one involved here should not be able to 
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circumvent such a fundamental right in the mere interest of 
expediency without establishing a valid waiver. A.B.4-22. 
In addition, Deboard's appeal merits review because "it is 
likely to recur" in the future to similarly situated defendants. 
Fife, 911 P.2d at 989. Specifically, defendants like Deboard may 
be sentenced to the maximum time allowed by law for their offense 
(as the court did here) on the premise that the court is merely 
trying to secure their presence for their "real" sentencing hearing 
to be held at a later date. Then, the defendant could 
theoretically serve almost his entire sentence before the rehearing 
is set. Hence, the court thereby effectively denies the defendant 
a "real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of 
[his] offense or in explanation of [his] conduct, as well as to 
correct any errors or mistakes in [pertinent pre-sentence] reports" 
that may have resulted in a more lenient or different sentence than 
the one actually served. Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839, 840-41 
(Utah 1972) ; see also A.B. Moreover, the court effectively denies 
the defendant the opportunity to post bail instead of jail time in 
the interim between conviction and sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-20-8 (1995) (providing for alternatives to incarceration after 
conviction but prior to sentencing as set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-20-10(2) (1995)); Utah Code Ann. § 77-20-10 (2) (a) (providing 
for bail in lieu of incarceration). 
In this manner, the instant case is distinguishable from State 
v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 176 (Utah App. 1996), upon which the State 
predominantly relies for its mootness argument. S.B.5-9. The 
3 
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defendant in Martinez was sentenced to a sixty day evaluation in 
the interim period between the withdrawal of her original attorney 
and the appearance of new counsel. Id. at 176. At the end of the 
court-imposed sixty day evaluation period, defendant appeared 
before the court again with her new attorney and was sentenced to 
a term of five-to-life imprisonment. Id. This Court ruled that 
defendant's claim that she was denied counsel when the court 
sentenced her to the sixty day evaluation was moot in part because 
"the unique facts of [that] case present[ed] a situation that is 
unlikely to recur in a similar manner." Id. at 177 (emphasis 
added). 
For the reasons stated above, the particular facts of this 
case present a situation that is likely to recur to other similarly 
situated individuals who, like Deboard, are "temporarily sentenced" 
pending the "real" sentencing hearing. Consequently, the "unlikely 
to recur" rationale in Martinez does not apply here and should not 
serve to render Deboard's appeal "moot." 
As a final matter, Deboard's issue on appeal merits review 
given that he and other defendants like him are affected for a 
relatively "brief time" and therefore "the issue is capable of 
evading review." Fife, 911 P. 2d at 991. In Deboard's case, he 
served sixty-five days of a sentence imposed without benefit of 
counsel in violation of his constitutional rights. R.61[6-7] . He 
was then re-sentenced with counsel present before he had time to 
appeal, let alone before his appeal could be perfected. Id. In a 
more general sense, the sentence of a similarly situated defendant 
4 
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may lapse before he gets a rehearing. By the time he files for 
appeal or his appeal is perfected, his sentence, and hence any 
legal remedy, expires. In this manner, the legitimate 
constitutional claims of Deboard and similarly situated individuals 
11
 evad[e] review." Id. 
In light of the foregoing, Deboard's issue on appeal is not 
moot. Rather, it falls within an exception to the mootness 
doctrine recognized by this Court in Fife, 911 P. 2d at 991. 
Accordingly, Deboard respectfully requests this Court to review his 
case on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Deboard respectfully requests this 
Court to vacate his sentence and remand for a new sentencing 
hearing. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Deboard requests oral argument and a published decision which 
clarifies that the procedure utilized by the sentencing judge in 
this case violates the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
SUBMITTED this IS±L day of March, 1999. 
W'-4-L? SL^' ^^^ ^ • ^ ^ * : C . 
CATHERINE L. BEGIC ° 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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